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I.

TURTSDICTTON:
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to

Section 78-2-2(3) (j) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended and the order
of reference issued by the Utah Supreme Court dated August 20,
1996.

IL

ISSUES AND STANDARD QF REVIEW;

A.

Ambiguity of Contract
Whether or not a contract is ambiguous is a question of law

which the appellate court decides with no particular deference to
the decision below under the correction of error standard.
Saunders

v. Sharp,

840 P. 2d 796 (Utah App.' 1992)

Interpretation of contracts is also a question of law,
reviewed under the same standard. Equitable
v. Ross,

849 P.2d 1187 (Utah App. 1993)

Life

& Cas.

Ins.

Co.

1 . The lower Court erred by holding that the contract was clear and
unambiguous.
2 . The lower Court erred in finding that there existed an enforceable contract
between plaintiff and defendants.
3 . The lower Court erred by reforming a clear and unambiguous contract.
4 . The lower Court erred by ordering specific performance for an ambiguous
contract.
5 . The lower Court erred in ordering a sale which was in violation of existing
water rights.
6 . The lower Court erred in disposing of Mrs. Baldwin's rights in the
property when Mrs. Baldwin was not a party to the contract upon which the
lower Court based its decision.
A l l of t h e above i s s u e s involve q u e s t i o n s of law and a r e
t h e r e f o r e reviewable without deference t o t h e lower c o u r t .
B.

Impropriety of Summary Judgment
In reviewing g r a n t of summary judgment, t h e Court of Appeals

l i b e r a l l y c o n s t r u e s t h e f a c t s and views t h e evidence in l i g h t most
f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p a r t y opposing t h e motion, and, because summary
judgment i s g r a n t e d as a m a t t e r of law, Court of Appeals i s
t o r e a p p r a i s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s l e g a l c o n c l u s i o n s . G.G.A.,
Leventis,

773 P.2d 841, (Utah App. 1989)

2

free
Inc.

v.

1. The lower Court erred by denying defendants1 motion for summary
judgment.
2. The lower Court erred by reversing the summary judgment previously
granted to defendants.
3. The lower Court erred by entering summary judgment in favor of plaintiff
when plaintiff had not moved for summary judgment.
C.

Procedural and Evidentiary Defects
In equity cases the court's scope of review is broad, and the

Court may weigh the evidence and determine the facts.
v. Bustamante,

Bustamante

645 P.2d 40,42 (Utah 1982) The Court is authorized

to exercise a broad scope of review encompassing both questions of
law and questions of fact.

Notwithstanding the trial court's

advantageous position in relation to questions of fact, when the
trial court has based its rulings upon a misunderstanding and
misapplication of the law, where a correct one would have produced
a different result, the party adversely affected is entitled to
have the error rectified in a proper adjudication under correct
principles of law.

Reed

v. Alvey,

610 P.2d 1374,1377 (Utah 1980)

The right to an equitable remedy is an exceptional one, and absent
statutory mandate, equitable relief should be granted only when
court determines that damages are inadequate and that equitable
relief will result in more perfect and complete justice. An
equitable remedy forecloses a legal one and vice versa.
v. Box Elder

County,

Thurston

892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995) The trial court's

decision to bar evidence from admission is a question of law to be

3

r e v i e w e d f o r c o r r e c t n e s s . Saunders

v. Sharp,

840 P . 2 d 796

(Utah

App. 1992)
1 . The lower Court erred by granting both a legal and equitable remedy to
plaintiff for the same alleged wrong.
2 . The lower Court erred in refusing the jury instructions and corrections to
jury instructions requested by defendants.
3 . The lower Court erred in refusing to give the jury the special verdict
interrogatories requested by defendants.
4 . The lower Court erred by refusing to accept offers of proof by defendants.
III.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ETC.:
Not

applicable.

IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

A.

Nature of the Case
Defendants in this case are a married couple who have

maintained their sole owned residence in Boulder Utah since the
1960 ! s .

The property they own in Boulder consists of a home and,

in front of that home on the state highway through Boulder two
small buildings that have been, at various times, either a store
or motel and a gas station or restaurant.

Because of the economy

in and about Boulder, Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin reside in the Mesa
Arizona area during the winter, where Mr. Baldwin has a full time
job with the city street department.

Mrs. Baldwin and the

children reside in their home in Boulder during the summer.

4

In June, 1984, Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin as lessors, entered into
a lease agreement with plaintiff below, Ada ("Billie") Jones and
Marylin Hansen as lessees, to lease the service station in front
of Baldwins1 home for conversion by lessees to use as a
restaurant.

One of the amendments to that agreement was the

removal of Ms. Hansen as a lessee.
lessors was never changed.

The identity of the owners and

That agreement was modified and

extended on several occasions.

Eventually a new document was

written up, using the original as a model.

The new agreement did

not include both Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin as parties.

The original

agreement contained a clause which addressed a "first option to
purchase the property" along with some terms and conditions for
establishing a sales price.

The second agreement contained a

clause which established a "first right of refusal" and which
contained similar or identical terms and conditions for
establishing a purchase price.
In May of 1993, Ms. Jones sent Baldwins a letter which
purported to be a tender of purchase under the second agreement.
The tender was made after some discussions in which Mrs. Baldwin
refused to sell the property and during which various offers,
including persons not a party to the second agreement, were
discussed and either rejected or abandoned.

That "tender" added

several terms that were not included in the agreement.

In June,

Mr. Baldwin wrote to Ms. Jones and explained that due to lack of
water, the property could not be sold.

Thereafter, Ms. Jones sued

for specific performance of the purported offer to sell and
damages for failure to do

so.

5

B .

Course of Proceedings
After initial discovery was completed, plaintiffs moved for

summary judgment.
motion.

Judge Mower held a hearing and granted that

Plaintiff did not move for summary judgment at that time.

After having lost the summary judgment, plaintiff moved to recuse
judge Mower and Judge Tibbs was assigned to the case.

Judge Tibbs

reversed Judge Mower's decision and entered partial summary
judgment in favor of plaintiff.

C.

Disposition at Trial Court
After a trial in which the Court refused numerous offers of

proof by plaintiff, the Court ruled in favor of plaintiff, granted
specific performance as to all items requested by plaintiff,
including those terms not included in any agreement, and submitted
the question of additional damages to the jury.
$8000 in damages.

The jury found

Those damages were awarded by Judge Tibbs in

addition to the "specific performance" already granted.
Defendants moved for a directed verdict or dismissal at the
close of plaintiff's case.
Judge Tibbs.

That was denied without explanation by

At the close of both cases, defendants requested

that a special verdict be used and that certain jury instructions
be given.

Those requests were denied.

After the jury returned

its verdict and the Court made additional findings, defendants
moved for a stay of execution pending appeal.

That was likewise

denied without explanation.
The judgment and findings were written by plaintiff's
attorney, in some cases in contrast to the findings announced by
the judge, and signed by Judge Tibbs on or about December 19,

6

1995.

The d e c i s i o n was recorded (and t h e r e f o r e entered) on

December 28, 1995.

This appeal was timely f i l e d from the e n t i r e

judgment and p r o c e e d i n g s .
Yt

RELEVANT FACTS? AND ftECORP CITATIONS;
1.

In the late 1960s David and Gloria Baldwin, together

with Gloria Baldwin's parents, Howard and Ida Church, acquired
some 30 acres of real property located in Boulder, Garfield
County, State of Utah.1
2.

At the time of acquisition, there was located on the

southwest corner of the subject property a small four-unit motel
which was served by a single membership in the Boulder Farmstead
Water Company.2
3.

Not long after acquisition, Defendants located a

personal residence on the subject property in close proximity to
the small motel and extended the water service to that residence.3
4.

Within a year following location of their personal

residence on the subject premises, Defendants commenced
construction of a service station near by, which they completed in
due course and extended the water service to said service station.
5.

For a period of time around the turn of the 60-70s

decade and during the early 1970s, the single water membership

1

Tr. pp. 309-312.

2

Tr. pp. 167-171.

3
4

Id.
Tr. pp. 167-171.
7

serviced the small motel, Defendants1 personal residence and the
service station, all of which are in reasonably close proximity on
the southwest corner of the property.5
6.

During the early to mid 1970s, Defendants ceased

operating the small motel and it fell into a state of disrepair.
The water service to the motel was discontinued and it has not had
water service since that time.6
7.

During the early 1980s Defendants also discontinued

operation of the service station and from that time until the
initial lease arrangement with Plaintiff and her partner in 1884,
the Boulder Farmstead Water membership served only Defendants1
personal residence.7
8.

Under date of June 6, 1984 Defendants entered into a

Lease Agreement with Plaintiff Ada Jones and her partner, Marilyn
Hansen, who proposed to operate a cafe in the premises previously
operated as a service station. The Lease Agreement was essentially
drafted by Hansen with some input from Plaintiff and Defendant
David Baldwin.8
9.

The initial Lease Agreement was amended by

interlineation and the copy now before the Court is the initialed

5

Tr. pp. 167-171.

6

Tr. pp. 167-171.

7

Tr. pp. 167-171.

8

Tr. pp. 289-294.
8

version. A second Agreement was entered into between David Baldwin
and Ada Jones on August 12, 1992.9
11.

The agreement of August 12, 1992 was written in the hand

of David Baldwin and signed by him and the Plaintiff. A copy of
that agreement was admitted at trial as Exhibit 2 and is hereafter
referred to as the "agreement," or the "second agreement."10
12.

Paragraph 3 of the agreement is at issue in this

litigation. It makes reference to a possible purchase by
Plaintiff. Though labeled a "right of refusal," Plaintiff claims
it is an "option" exercisable by her at will.11
13.

The Plaintiff and her partner required both David and

Gloria Baldwin to sign the initial Lease Agreement, but did not
require Gloria, a joint owner of the property, to sign the second
Agreement.12
14.

Some time between the initial Lease Agreement and the

second Agreement, Plaintiff began using a portion of the old motel
as a gift shop. She later discontinued the gift shop and used a
portion of the old motel as a personal sleeping area, but without
any plumbing or water service.13
15.

During the time covered by the two subject leases the

single membership in the Boulder Farmstead Water Company has

9

Id.

See also, trial exhibits 1 and 2.

10

Id.

See also, trial exhibits 1 and 2.

11

Complaint.

12

Tr. pp. 289-294; trial exhibits 1 and 2.

13

Tr. p. 440.
9

served both Defendants1 personal residence and the service station
remodeled as a cafe.14
16.

Defendants are the owners of the subject membership in

the Boulder Farmstead Water Company.15
17.

The Boulder Farmstead Water Company recognizes a single

membership serving both the residential and commercial uses of a
single owner, but will not split such membership.16
18.

At the time of initial purchase, the full acreage was

owned in undivided interests between the Baldwins and the
Churches, who are Mrs. Baldwinfs parents. There have been
subsequent transfers between these parties, but it has always been
understood that Baldwins are the owners of the parcel on which
their home is located and would be entitled to a deed to the
same.17
19.

Within the two years prior to this litigation a major

portion of the 30 acres originally purchased was sold to one Mark
Austin. Both Baldwins and Churches had an equitable interest in
the property sold. The sale excluded the parcel whereon Baldwins1
home is located.18
20.

A couple of months after signing the August agreement,

probably in October of 1992, Plaintiff and a friend, Mark Austin,

14

Tr.

15

Tr. p p . 495-498;

16

p.

207.

504-511

Id.

17

Tr. pp.

18

Tr. pp. 244-245.

167-169.

10

approached Defendant David Baldwin about buying all of Baldwins f
property, including the cafe and motel, the personal residence and
some adjoining acreage. Baldwin said "maybe."19
21.

In December of 1992 the Plaintiff called David Baldwin

and requested a price for the cafe, house and adjoining acreage.
David Baldwin responded in writing, quoting a price of $320,000
for everything.20
22.

Defendants did not quote a separate price for the cafe

alone, and the next contact between the parties was a proposed
"Tender" which Plaintiff had her attorney, Jackson Howard, prepare
and send to Defendants. A copy of the Tender document was admitted
as Exhibit "3." It suggests an approach to appraising the
property, or in the alternative arbitrarily fixes a price of
$40,000 for the leased premises. As appears on the face of the
document, it includes additional terms not included in the
parties1 written Agreement.21
23.

Defendant David Baldwin responded in a writing of June

10, 1993, a copy of which was admitted as Exhibit "5." The
response withdraws the offer for sale and refers to a problem
relating to a culinary water hookup.
24.

The culinary water hookup is through the Boulder

Farmstead Water Company. Baldwins are the owners of one share
constituting a single membership. The hookup serves their cafe,

19

Id.

20

Tr. p. 160.

21

Tr. p. 423.
11

motel and personal residence. The water connection has served the
residence since the early 1970s. The Boulder Farmstead Water
Company has declined to split the Baldwins1 membership. A letter
from the water company was admitted as Exhibit "4."
25.

on August 1, 1993 the Defendant David Baldwin furnished

Plaintiff a writing stating that if he "would ever decide to sell"
the property being operated by Ada Jones he would give her credit
of $15,036 toward the purchase price. When Baldwin gave Plaintiff
this writing, there was no discussion about any of the other
pending matters, including the Tender made through Plaintiff's
lawyer and David Baldwin's response that he was withdrawing the
offer to sell. Plaintiff has acknowledged that the only way she
would receive equity would be as a purchaser of the property.22

VI.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The decisions of the Court below appealed in this matter are

inconsistent with law, logic, and equity.

The Court has entered a

judgment purporting to enforce an agreement which is materially
different from the writing which both sides agree constitute the
agreement.

At different times the Court has stated that the

contract which it purported to enforce, was either ambiguous or
non-ambiguous, depending upon what the Court was doing at the
time.

The decision below is wrong in either case.

If the

contract to be enforced is ambiguous, it is not suitable to
specific performance.

22

Nonetheless, the Court granted specific

Tr. pp. 155-157; 411-412.
12

performance.

If the contract to be enforced is unambiguous, it

may not be reformed.

In this case the judge below reformed the

contract to include price, particularities of survey, quality of
title, method of conveyance of title, environmental warranties and
abatement, and other material terms.

Whether the contract was

ambiguous or unambiguous, the judge's orders are inconsistent with
the express terms of the agreement concerning how the price was to
be fixed.
The judge below ignored the plain language of the contract to
change a right of first refusal into an option to purchase.

He

went further and allowed a purported tender to add to and vary the
terms of the agreement under which it was purportedly made.

In

short, the decision below violates every basic principle of
contract formation, interpretation, and enforcement.
This case was initially decided in favor of Defendants in
summary judgment.

When Judge Tibbs was given the case, he

reversed that decision and granted summary judgment for Plaintiff
improperly.

In light of the fact adduced at trial it is clear

that Plaintiff was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The judge below made numerous extraordinary rulings against
Defendants which prevented them from adequately trying the issues
in the case.

The Court not only refused to take evidence on

issues framed by Defendants1 Answer, the Court even refused
proffers of that evidence.
The decision below was arbitrary, capricious, and must in law
and good conscience be reversed.

13

VIIt ARGUMENT
The gravamen of this appeal is that the Court below committed
a fundamental error of law with respect to its interpretation of
the contract on which the case is based.

The contract at issue

was a short, hand written document which contained some provisions
of a previous typewritten agreement, some modifications of
provisions of that previous agreement, some new provisions, and a
change of parties.

The lower Court held that hand written

contract was sufficiently unambiguous to warrant granting specific
performance.

Specific performance can only be granted if the

agreement to be enforced meets an unusually high level of clarity
and certainty.
The contract which gave rise to this suit failed that test on
its face because the provision which the lower Court construed as
an option to purchase expressly states that it is a right of first
refusal. Since there is a facial conflict between the result
reached by the Court below and the wording of the document, there
is, a fortiori,

an ambiguity. The Court below concluded that the

right of first refusal was not a first refusal, but an option,
because of the language of a previous contract which had been
changed in arriving at the final contract.

The Court held,

starting at page 663 of the transcript:
12
The Court finds the parties subsequently entered
13 into an agreement, as set forth in EXHIBIT NO. 2, which
14 purports to be a lease, also, although it's designated by
15 the grant; that Mr. Baldwin is the grantor and Mrs. Jones is
16 the grantee.
17
The Court finds that in order for understand this
18 agreement you must compare it with EXHIBIT NO. 1 ...
Page 664
14
The Court finds that a tender was made in
15 conformity with the law, that there was no justification for
14

16 a refusal to comply with the UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, and the
17 Court finds that the defendants refused to comply with the
18 option; and the Court finds that although EXHIBIT NO. 2
is
19 ambiguous in places, that the only way it can be
construed,
2 0 reading paragraph 3, is that the plaintiff had a right
to
21 purchase the property to make an option on the
property.
The lower Court's holding violates the doctrine of
construction to give meaning to all parts of the contract and the
Parole Evidence Rule, which requires that extrinsic evidence
varying meaning of the contract will not be taken to modify the
terms of a clear and unambiguous contract.
In other words, the Court below held that a contract was
clear and unambiguous because the contract had a facial ambiguity
that required reference to previous contracts to determine what
the second contract meant. Once it considered the previous
contract, the Court felt the second contract was clear. The
Court's determination that there was no ambiguity was on the basis
of extrinsic evidence which it could only consider if the
underlying contract was ambiguous.

The decision below was

therefore legally, as well and logically, fallacious.
The genesis of this error of law was when Judge Tibbs was
assigned to the case and reversed the well reasoned Summary
Judgment decision of his predecessor judge.
Plaintiff in the case below was awarded specific performance
of a contract which plaintiff urged required the sale of land. The

15

judge below held that contract was ambiguous.23 It is hornbook law
that a court may not: grant specific performance unless the
contract is completely clear and unambiguous. The Supreme Court in
Pitcher

v. Lauritzen,
423 P.2d 491 (Utah 1967) held:
Specific performance cannot be required unless all
terms of the agreement are clear.
The court cannot
compel the performance of a contract which the parties
did not mutually agree upon. See Bowman v. Rayburn,
115
Colo. 82, 170 P.2d 271.
In speaking of certain terms required for specific
performance, the author in 4 9 Am. Jur., Specific Performance,
Section 22, at page 35 uses this language:
The contract must be free from doubt, vagueness, and
ambiguity, so as to leave nothing to conjecture or to
be supplied by the court.
It must be sufficiently
certain and definite in its terms to leave no
reasonable doubt as to what the parties intended, and
no reasonable doubt of the specific thing equity is
called upon to have performed, and it must be
sufficiently certain as to its terms so that the court
may enforce it as actually made by the parties.
A
greater degree of certainty is required for specific
performance in equity than is necessary to establish a
contract as the basis of an action at law for damages.
(Emphasis added.)
The contract at issue was far from being "sufficiently

certain and definite in its terms to leave no reasonable doubt as
to what the parties intended, and no reasonable doubt of the
specific thing equity is called upon to have performed.7'

The

contract at issue was missing essential terms, and the order of
the court required defendants to perform in ways not even hinted
at by the agreement itself.
This suit was to enforce a contract for sale of property
which even Plaintiff maintains is jointly owned by David and
Gloria Baldwin but, where the contract was signed only by one.

23

Tr. pp. 693, 1. 25 - 649, 1. 7.
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That contract conspicuously omits to even mention the other
property owner.

In light of that facial disparity of parties, the

only legal theory on which the Court below could justify forcing a
sale as they have done is on some kind of agency theory.

Since

the agreement sought to be enforced does not mention any agency
and Mrs. Baldwinfs expressed opposition thereto, the Court's sub
rosa

finding of proper parties is highly questionable.
In G.G.A.,

Inc.

v. Leventis,

773 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1989)

this court states:
In interpreting a contract, we determine what the
parties intended by examining the entire contract and
all of its parts in relation to each other, giving an
objective and reasonable construction to the contract
as a whole. Sears v. Riemersma,
655 P.2d 1105, 1107-08
(Utah 1982) . The cardinal rule is to give effect to
the intentions of the parties and, if possible, to
glean those intentions from the contract itself.
LDS
Hosp. v. Capitol
Life Ins. Co., 7 65 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah
1988) . Additionally, a contract should be interpreted
so as to harmonize all of its terms and provisions,
and all of its terms should be given effect if
possible. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.r
752 P.2d 892,
895 (Utah 1988) .
The focal point in this case is whether in light of the
underlying lease provision, Leventisfs letter effectuated an
option or if it created a right of first refusal which was
open for ninety days.
"An option to purchase property
is a contract in which the owner of the property sells
to the optionee the right to buy the property in
accordance with the terms and conditions specified in
the option." Spokane School Dist.
No. 81 v. Parzybok,
96
Wash.2d 95, 633 P.2d 1324, 1325 (1981). "A right of first
refusal to purchase property is different from an
option in that a right of first refusal is not binding
unless the offeror decides to sell the property."
11
S. Williston, Contracts Sec. 1441A, at 949-50 (3rd ed. 1968);

Northwest

Television

Club,

Inc.

v. Gross Seattle,

Inc.,

26

Wash.App. Ill, 612 P.2d 422, 425 (1980). (Emphasis added.)
The agreement sought to be enforced expressly states that it
is a "first right of refusal."

The predecessor document used the

phrase "first option to purchase the property."

17

The lower Court's

construction of the second agreement as an option contravenes the
well established rule of contract interpretation that a
construction which give meanings to all the terms of a contract
will be preferred over one which renders some term meaningless.
The lower Court's decision amounts to holding the parties1
determination to change specific wording was meaningless.
The Court below justified its rewriting of the contract bystating it was ambiguous. As is shown above, that alone makes the
decision illegal. Assuming, arguendo,

that the contract was

ambiguous, the duty of the Court is to effect the intention of the
parties.

The Court below ordered

Baldwins to remove storage

tanks, which both parties knew about, but which both sides agreed
had never been discussed prior to Plaintiff's "tender".
The evidence at trial was uncontested that it was legally
impossible, because of lack of water and water district
restrictions, to sever the two separate parcels; the residence
which was not involved and the commercial property which was.
Plaintifffs Sole theory below was that they had tendered
performance and the tender had not been objected to timely.

It is

uncontroverted the tender included terms, such as a survey, ALTA
title insurance, storage tank removal, severance of water rights,
etc., which were different from or in addition to the terms of the
agreement under which they purported to make the tender.

A tender

which varies the terms of the contract is a breach and therefore
ineffective.

Nevertheless, the Court below enforced that tender.

As such, the enforcement of that defective tender is grounds for
reversal.
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A.

THE COURT CANNOT WRITE THE PARTIES1 CONTRACT FOR THEM.
"A condition precedent to the enforcement of any contract is

that there be a meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be
spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient
definiteness to be enforced."24
Sufficient definiteness is required so that the Court is not
left with the task of writing an agreement for the parties. "[T]he
court cannot fabricate the kind of a contract the parties ought to
have made and enforce it."25 Although it is not necessary that the
contract provide for every collateral matter or possible
contingency, the parties themselves must have set forth with
sufficient definiteness at least the essential terms of the
contract.26

B.

A CONTRACT WHICH IS INDEFINITE AS TO A MATERIAL TERM

CANNOT BE ENFORCED.
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that where an
agreement leaves open to future negotiation any material term, the

Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (1961); accord Pingree v.
Continental Group of Utah, 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976); D. H. Overmyer Co. v.
Brown, 439 F.2d 926, 929); Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 R2d 597, 600 (1962);
Hansen v. Snell, 11 Utah 2d 64, 354 P.2d 10 , 1072 (1960).
25

Valcarce,
supra .

26

D. H. Overmyer
Co., supra,;
Nixon & Nixon,
Inc.,
Si Associates,
641 P . 2 d 1 4 4 , 146 ( U t a h 9 8 2 ) ; Kier
25 U t a h 2d 1 3 9 , 478 P . 2 d 3 2 7 , 330 ( 1 9 7 0 ) .

362 P . 2 d a t

428-429/
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accord

D. H.

Overmyer
v.
v.

Co.,

,

John NewCondrack,

agreement is unenforceable.27

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,

interpreting Utah law, has reached the same conclusion.28
In Pingree

v.

Continental

Group of

Utah,

558 P.2d 1317, 1321

(Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court refused to grant the
plaintiff/lesseefs demand for specific enforcement of the
following lease renewal provision:
The Lessee shall have and is hereby granted the option to
renew this lease ... upon the same terms and conditions
contained herein except that the rental amount will be
renegotiated; however, maximum total rental shall not exceed
$900.00 per month.
Factors of tax increase, costs of business increases or
decreases, business volume and success, insurance costs and
other reasonable allowance, will be the basis for terms of
negotiation.29
The trial court had held that the parties, had agreed upon
"reasonable rent."

It then determined for the parties what

reasonable rent would be.30
The Utah Supreme court, however, rejected this approach. The
court recognized that the lower court's decision had the effect of
nullifying the factors specified by the parties, and "substituting
a new agreement to which the parties had not committed

27

Cottonwood
Mall v. Sine,
161 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988);
Pingree,
supra.
Compare Nixon & Nixon Inc.,
supra,
(agreement was
enforceable since not uncertain as to essential term); Kier/
supra,
(agreement was enforceable since only "incidental
details" were left to future negotiation).

28

D. H. Overmyer

29

558 P.2d at 1320-1321.

30

Id. at p. 1321.

Co.,

supra.
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themselves.31 Moreover, the lack of any objective standard by which
to evaluate the parties, opposing factual contentions concerning
reasonable rent rendered the provision fatally vague and too
indefinite for enforcement. Thus, the original lease was held to
have expired under its own terms.32 Twelve years later the Utah
Supreme court reaffirmed this position in Cottonwood

Mall

v.

Sinef

767 p.2d 499 (Utah 1988). Once again the dispute arose over an
agreement to renew an existing lease. The oral agreement included
a promise to renew the lease upon "reasonable terms."33 The court,
however, found that the minor differences between the facts in
Pingree

and the facts in Cottonwood

Mall

had no affect upon its

analysis:
Defendant [lessee] would have us now do what we refused to do
in Pingree.
While it is true that defendant adduced evidence
as to what would be a reasonable renewal term and what would
be a reasonable rent, the trial court properly spurned
defendant's invitation to find or make an agreement where the
parties had themselves failed. Defendant argues that in
Pingree,
the court declined to fix the renewal rent because
of the difficulty in balancing the several factors which the
lease required the parties to consider in fixing the rent.
Here, the defendant's argument continues, no factors are
listed in the lease and the task is less complicated. We do
not agree. In determining what is "reasonable rent," many
factors must be weighed and put into the equation. Business
judgments must be made ... Courts simply are not equipped to
make monetary decisions impacted by the fluctuating
commercial world and are even less prepared to impose
paternalistic agreements on litigants.34

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

34

767 P . 2 d a t

500.

Id.
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The court concluded that the original lease had terminated by
its own terms and it would not be renewed f or the parties by the
court.35
Even before these decisions, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals applied this rule of law in D. H. Overmyer

Co.,.

This

decision involved an attempted purchase of a corporation through
the acquisition of its stock. The preliminary letter agreement for
the sale of the stock had provided that a later contract would be
executed.
Among the provisions contained in the letter agreement was
the requirement that the sellers would provide " [appropriate
warranties, representations and indemnifications with respect to
the financial status of the Corporation ... as represented by its
balance sheet ... . "36
The buyer later discovered that the sellers had not disclosed
numerous significant liabilities of the corporation. The buyer
nonetheless wished to proceed with the sale, but with either
increased specificity in the warranties, representations, and
indemnifications, or a reduction in the sale price. The parties
were unable to reach an agreement, and the buyer sued for specific
performance of the letter agreement.
The district court found that the provision of the letter
agreement relating to the sellers1 warranties, representations and
indemnifications was uncertain and indefinite in that it failed to

35
36

Id.
489 F.2d, p. 928.
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specify which warranties, representations and indemnifications
would be "appropriate." It, therefore, declined to grant the
buyer's request for specific performance.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district
court and articulated its reasons why the letter agreement could
not be enforced:
As concerns an agreement to enter into a contract, the
general rule is that where the agreement itself contains all
essential terms it may be specifically enforced even though
the parties contemplated the subsequent execution of a formal
contract. The converse of this proposition is that an
agreement to enter into a contract will not be specifically
enforced where the agreement is incomplete or indefinite as
to substantial and material matters ... .37

C.

THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT PROVIDE A MEANS FOR FIXING THE

PURCHASE PRICE WITHOUT THE FURTHER EXPRESSION OF THE
PARTIESThe Utah Supreme Court has consistently been unwilling to
supply the missing elements for parties who have agreed on
"reasonable" terms. For example, in Cottonwood

Mall

v.

Sine

,

38

the Supreme Court stated: "In determining what is 'reasonable
rent1 many factors must be weighed and put into the equation.
Business judgments must be made ... Courts simply are not equipped
to make monetary decisions impacted by the fluctuating commercial
world and even less prepared to impose paternalistic agreements on
litigants."

37

Id.

38

767 P.2d 499, 500 (Utah 1988). Other cases cited herein also
support this point.

at 929.
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In light of the existing precedent, Utah Courts should not
fix a price for the purchase of real property when the parties
have only specified "fair market value." There are marked
similarities between such a term and "reasonable rent." With minor
exceptions, other courts which have undertaken to supply a meaning
to "reasonable" price or "fair market value," have required that
the agreement provide an "objective" means for doing so without
requiring any additional expression by the parties themselves.
Cases dealing with the subject matter have been assembled in
an annotation appearing in 2 A.L.R. 3d 701; a photocopy thereof
(together with the July, 1994 supplement) being attached hereto
for review by the Court. The applicable rule of law is stated as
follows:
(O]ption agreements have generally been held unenforceable
for lack of definiteness of price if the parties both fail to
provide for a specific price to be paid for the property, and also
fail to specify a practicable mode by which the price can be
determined with certainty by the courts without any new expression

by the pities themselves.39
A small number of cases in the A.L.R. which at first blush
might appear to support plaintiff's position, on closer
examination are distinguishable and involve different contractual
provisions. There are no Utah cases which support Plaintiff's
position.

39

2 A.L.R.

3d.

703.
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Both the initial Lease Agreement and the second Agreement
entered into between these parties contained the following
language:
The purchase price shall be fixed, at that time, at fair
market value, as established by the opinion of three (3)
independent appraisers, to be selected by mutual agreement cf
the Parties hereto.
The agreement did not simply call for application of "fair
market value," but called for the future selection, by mutual
agreement, of three appraisers who would then fix the value.
It should further be recognized that the contractual right to
select appraisers may be of considerable value and should not be
usurped by the Court when the parties have agreed otherwise. Who
is selected to do the appraisals may be of major consequence as
the Utah Supreme Court seems to recognize in Redevelopment
of Salt

Lake

C. v. Mitsui

Inv.,

Inc.,40

Agency

The Court noted the wide

disparity between the appraised values of the experts. The
Plaintiff's experts pegged the value at $156,125 and $156,165
respectively, whereas the Defendants two experts came in at
$242,784 and $246,764. The Court recognized that the appraisal
process is not wholly scientific:
But the work of an appraiser, though it can be in a sense
factual and scientific in some of its aspects, is also an
art, in that it reflects the creative talents, the
experience, the integrity, and in sum, the personalized
judgment of the individual appraisers. It is his prerogative
to select and analyze the various factors which seem
important to him in arriving at his estimate as to value.

40

522 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1974).
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Therefore no one should be able to put him a straight jacket
as to his method... 41
The analysis lends support to the Court's refusal to assume
the responsibility of defining what would be "reasonable" when the
parties have failed to do so, and further suggests caution in
deciding upon appraisers when the parties have reserved that right
to themselves.
Sensing the obvious inadequacy of the agreement reached, the
Plaintiff, through the Tender drafted by her attorney, asks the
Court to rewrite the Agreement to provide that each party select
one appraiser and that the two then select a third. Such an
agreement would be more workable, but the Court cannot exercise
the powers of reformation when the parties have not so agreed. The
only means in which the Court in this case could carry out the
terms of the parties agreement would be to order them to agree on
three appraisers . There is no objective means by which such could
be accomplished.
A review of the cases from the A.L.R.

annotation reveals the

soundness of the general rule of law that the court cannot supply
the price if there is any new expression required from the
parties. Goodwest
Contracts,

Rubber

Corp.

v. Munoz ,42 relying on 1

Williston,

(3d Ed. 1957) § 41 and states that the language of the

41

Id. at p. 1373. The Court's expression was reinforced in Utah
Dept. Transp.
v. Jones,
694 P.2d 1035, 1038 (Utah 1964).

42

216 Cal. Rptr. 604, 605 (Cal. App. 1985).
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agreement must provide a "practicable mode to determine price
without any new expression by the parties themselves.43
Similarly, in Tonkery

v. Martina

,44 the court found the price

"may be sufficiently definite if the amount can be determined
objectively without the need for new expressions by the parties.45
On appeal the Court of Appeals for New York affirmed, noting that
the option "provided the method for selection of appraisers"
concluding that this "provides an objective standard that renders
the ... [option] definite and enforceable.46
The Pennsylvania case of Portnoy

v. Brown41

enforced an option

which provided only that the price would be the "current market
value at the end of the final term." The case is distinguishable
because no additional expression was required from the parties, as
in the case at bar. Reliance was placed on the Williston treatise
on contracts [§41 (3d Ed. 1957)], a photocopy of which is attached
hereto for review by the Court. The discussion in Williston

is

essentially about goods and services and not real property which
rises to a much higher level of "uniqueness." Even then,
Williston

r

s language is in accord with the language in the

annotation. Williston states:

43

216 Cal. Rptr. p. 605.

44

562 N.Y.S.2d 895 (A.D. 4 Dept, 1990).

45

Id. p. 895.

46

Tonkery

47

243 A.2d 444 (Penn. 1968)

v. Martina.

577 N.E.2d 1042 (N.Y.App. 1971)
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A.L.R.

If a promise indefinite as to price is capable of being made
certain by an objective standard as, for example, extrinsic facts,
it is enforceable.48
The Portnoy
quod cerium

reddi

court goes on to recite the Maxim, "id
potest'

certum

est

(that is certain which can be made

certain)." While this phrase might be applied to a contract which
employs only a standard of "fair market value," it could not be
applied to an agreement that the parties will select three
appraisers by mutual agreement at a future time; for that can only
be accomplished by the parties themselves. There is no "objective
standard" by which it can be enforced; and the very effort would
run counter to the volitional nature of a mutual agreement.
In summary, there is a complete absence of any legal
authority for enforcing the type of "agreement to agree" which
exists in this case. Where additional expressions have been
contemplated by the agreements of the parties, as here, the Courts
have declined to interfere, there being no objective way to supply
that which must come from the parties themselves.

D.

THE COURT CANNOT REFORM AN AGREEMENT NOT MADE.
obviously recognizing the inadequacy of the Agreement reached

and its lack of sufficient definiteness to allow enforcement,
Plaintiff advances a cause of action for reformation. The problem
with the prayed-for relief is that Plaintiff is really asking the
Court to write the agreement rather than reform it. She asks the

48

Id.

at p. 133.
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Court to impose an agreement upon on the parties which Plaintiff
admits they did not make. Such is contrary to law. In the
relatively recent case of Grahn v.

Gregory,

49

the Utah Court of

Appeals articulated the applicable rule of law, to-wit:
Reformation is appropriate where the written instrument is
not in conformity with the parties agreement, not where the
parties have failed to agree, we will not make a contract for
the parties which they did not make, only reform a contract
to reflect the agreement they actually made.
Both at trial and during her deposition, the Plaintiff
waffled a good deal about the meaning of paragraph 3 of the second
agreement. During deposition her own counsel put the question to
her with blunt, clear brevity. Her answer was equally clear and
blunt and betrays the position she has taken in the litigation:
BY MR. DAYNES:
Q
Turning to the agreement itself, what was your
understanding that Paragraph 3 meant?
A

The right of refusal.

Q

What did that mean to you?

A
That, if David had another buyer, that he would come and
let me know and I would have the opportunity to buy the
property or refuse.
(Ada "Billie" Jones deposition pp. 93-94, cited at trial at
pp. 409-414.)

49

800 P.2d 320, 325-326 (Ut. App. 1990)

E.

THE PARTIES AGREEMENT DID NOT ADDRESS THE MATTER OF

WARRANTIES, INCLUDING PARTICULARLY THE WARRANTY AGAINST
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS.
Plaintiff's position, as adopted by the Court below, is that
the conveyance must be by warranty deed. There simply is no such
term mentioned in either agreement.
Similarly, no environmental issues are even discussed, nor
were there any negotiations on the matter.

However, had the

parties intended to allow a forced sale, there should have been
because they are essential and represent an increasingly important
area of concern in real estate transactions, as the following
discussion supports.
The Utah Hazardous Substances Mitigation Act imposes a heavy
burden on all responsible parties. The Act defines a "Responsible
Party" as including "the owner or operator of a Facility.50 A
"Facility," in turn, is defined as "any building, structure,
installation ... storage container ... or ... any site or area where a
hazardous material or substance has been deposited, stored,
disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located.51 The
bottom line is that Defendants would be Responsible Parties and so
would Plaintiff if she were to obtain title. The consequence of
becoming a "Responsible Party" was recently set forth by the Utah
Supreme court in Utah Dept..

of Env.

Quality

v.

Wind

Utah Code Annotated § 19-6-302 (18) (a) (i) .
Utah Code Annotated § 19-6-302 (5)(a)(i), (ii).
30

River

Petroleum52

in which it held that an owner of property is strictly

liable for the cost of cleanup even if such owner did not actively
cause the pollution; and further, once the Department of
Environmental Quality identifies one Responsible Party, the latter
bears the burden of locating and joining other responsible parties
as codefendants. It is an onerous burden concerning which the
matter of warranties is crucial.
Plaintiff understandably raised the environmental warranty in
her Tender, evidencing the essential nature of such a provision,
but it was never negotiated nor agreed to by these parties and it
cannot be supplied by the Court. On this issue, the Tenth Circuit
decision in D. H. Overmyer

Co. v. Brown,53

is squarely in point.

Ten years ago, in the first agreement, before the passing of the
environmental requirements discussed above, and before the
appreciation in property that has occurred generally throughout
Utah in recent years, the parties placed a minimum -maximum value
of $70,000 - $120,000 on the premises. Plaintiff has now offered
$40,000, less "equity" and costs of suit and the lower Court has
enforced that. Plaintiff would give the Defendants a fraction of
what they consider their property is worth, require them to assume
the present environmental liability and then warrant and indemnify
as against all future problems. Plaintiff wants more than the
historical warranty of marketability, her tender insists on what
is tantamount to a liability insurance policy. Defendants haven't

52

246 Ut.Ad.Rpt. 6, (Aug. 29, 1994).

53

439 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1971).
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agreed to the former, let alone the latter; and Plaintiff has so
acknowledged.

F.

PLAINTIFF HAS ADMITTED THAT THE PARTIES DID NOT REACH

AGREEMENT ON THE ESSENTIAL TERMS OF PURCHASE AND THAT SHE
WANTS THE COURT TO SUPPLY THOSE TERMS,
Plaintiff's reformation effort evidences the inadequacy of
the agreement reached. A comparison of the parties1 actual
agreement with the language which Plaintiff's Complaint asks the
court to supply is revealing. It evidences at once what the
"essential terms" are and their absence from the Agreement. They
were similarly absent from the parties negotiations.
The following table shows that what plaintiff was awarded by
the lower court vastly exceeds the terms agreed to between the
parties:

Agreement Language

1 L a n g u a g e Requested In
|

Plaintiff'ss Complaint

That the grantor hereby grants
the use of to grantee certain
restaurant (or cafe) and motel
(or gift shop) property located
in Boulder Utah, Garfield
County, State of Utah.

The property which is the
subject of this agreement is
generally described as the cafe,
appurtenances and side yards
traditionally and historically
used as part of the cafe
property.
|

3. At any time during this
agreement the grantee may have
the first right of refusal to
purchase said property.

3. The lessee is granted an
option to purchase the subject
property by giving the lessor
written notice of her intent to
do so during the lease period.
The terms of purchase are set
forth in provisions A and B
following, to wit:
[
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A. The purchase price shall be
fixed, at that time, at a fair
market value, as established by
the opinions of three (3)
independent appraisers, to be
selected by mutual agreement of
the parties hereto.

A. The purchase price shall be
$40,000 or if the seller
believes is worth more than that
sum, and notifies the lessee in
writing at the time lessee
elects to exercise his option,
then, the purchase price will be
determined by appraisal, each
party to select an appraiser and
the two selected to select a
third, and the value determined
by majority vote of the
appraisers shall be the sale
price. The parties shall each
pay one-half of the cost of such
(appraisal.
|

B. The remaining terms of such
purchase shall be established at
that time by mutual agreement of
the parties hereto.

B. The sale price so determined
shall be paid in cash at time of
closing which will be within 30
days of the determination of
sale price, at an escrow company
in Garfield County, selected by
Seller.
|

[No comparable provision]

C. Title shall be conveyed by
good and sufficient warranty
deed, supported to owner's title
policy to ALTA standards,
showing the property free and
clear of all encumbrances
including environmental
restrictions
j

[No comparable provision]

D. The premises which are the
subject of this lease option
agreement are those
traditionally used as a
restaurant and leased by the
lessee under the terms and
|
conditions of the agreement,
Exhibit "B," which premises
|
shall be reduced to a survey
description to be established by I
a surveyor mutually acceptable j
to both parties, the cost of
j
which survey shall be paid by
j
the seller.
j

[No comparable provision]

E. The premises shall include
the water right traditionally
and presently utilized in and
for the cafe and the utility
easements presently used on the
said premises. The seller will
arrange to transfer to the buyer
the water which presently
services the premises in the
quantity and to the pressure
heretofore historically
provided.

Plaintiff was asked about most of these terms which her
Complaint recognizes as essential. She was obliged to admit that
there had never been an agreement reached thereon.

Starting on

page 411 of the trial transcript, plaintiff specifically admitted
that there was no agreement to sell, and no agreement, on the terms
that she was given by the court below.
PAGE 411
1
MR. WILLARDSON: Okay.
2
Q
Ifd like to you turn to page 90 in that
3 deposition. At the top of the page, QUESTION: "Now you're
4 saying that there was something else you requested be
put
5 in?"
6
ANSWER: "On August 12th, when David was
7 writing—when I was over there." Now that's August 12th of
8 1992, isn't it?
9
A
Yes.
10
Q
QUESTION: "You didn't get it put in on the 12?"
11
ANSWER: "No."
12
QUESTION: "Nor in between or on the 18th?"
13
ANSWER: "No, it wasn't."
14
QUESTION:
"And what you specifically asked him to
15 put in was — ?"
16
ANSWER:
"To be able to purchase the property and
1 7 my equity in there. "
18
QUESTION:
"And it just never got in?"
19
ANSWER:
"It never got in."
20
The QUESTION:
"Alright, and then, it was never
21 talked about again?"
22
ANSWER:
"No, not after the lease was drawed up."
PAGE 412
Is that a correct statement of your testimony
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5 under oath?
6
A
Yes, it is.
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Q
Let's go back to the terms of EXHIBIT 2, which is
the handwritten f92 agreement. Do you understand those, the
provisions in paragraph 3, 3-A and 3-B to be harmonious.
MR. HOWARD: Objection, repetition.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q
BY MR. WILLARDSON: Do you agree that paragraph
14 of the f92 agreement was a valid part of the agreement
throughout its term.
MR. HOWARD: Objection, it's irrelevant.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q
BY MR. WILLARDSON: I'd like you to look at
EXHIBIT 1, paragraph 14; is that a correct statement of your
intention in entering into that agreement?
MR. HOWARD: Objection. Speaks for itself.
MR. WILLARDSON: The question is as to her
intention.
MR. HOWARD: It doesn't matter.
THE COURT: It doesn't matter. The objection is
sustained..
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Q
Paragraph 15, is that a correct statement of your
intention.
MR. HOWARD: Objection. That's irrelevant.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. WILLARDSON: Your Honor,—
THE COURT: It speaks for itself, counsel. That's
all I can say. It speaks for itself. It's not ambiguous 5
It speaks for itself.
MR. WILLARDSON: Well, Ifm asking the witness to
speak for herself.
THE COURT: Well, Ifm just saying it's sustained.

Compare Tr. pp. 693-4 where the Court denies that the
contract was unambiguous as follows:
19
MR. WILLARDSON: Provo City Corporation Vs.
20 Nielson Scott Company, Inc., 603 PII 803, says the court
21 will not [re]write an unambiguous contract.
22
MR. HOWARD: That's Hornbook law. We all know
23 that.
24
MR. WILLARDSON:
The Court has previously found
2 5 that contract was unambiguous.
PAGE 694
1
THE COURT:
That's not so.
2
MR. WILLARDSON: Okay. Then, Your Honor, if you
3 have found that the contract is ambiguous, then I believe
4 that we are entitled to an instruction requesting whether
5 there was a meeting of the minds as to the parties.
6
THE COURT: All right. That's denied.
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12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. WILLARDSON: Let's go back to the tender.
That seems to be something we can talk about.
You previously told me that except for something
about the appraisers and something about purchasing, none of
the terms in that document had been agreed to by either Mr.
Baldwin or Mrs. Baldwin; is that correct.
MR. HOWARD: Objection. It's irrelevant.
Furthermore, it speaks for itself.
MR. WILLARDSON: I'm just trying to summarize the
witness!s testimony so I can make sure that I don't have to
replow any ground.
MR. HOWARD: Her testimony doesn't have to be
summarized. The jury heard it. We have heard it and I
object to summarizations.
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1
THE COURT: If there's something specific,
2 counsel, let's get specific. The objection is sustained.
3
Q
BY MR. WILLARDSON: Prior to bringing this
4 lawsuit, you had never discussed with either Mr. or Mrs.
5 Baldwin the process for selecting the three independent
6 appraisers, had you?
7
THE WITNESS: I assume that it was, because it was
8 in the lease.
9
Q
Prior to filing this lawsuit, you had never
10 discussed the process for selecting the three independent
11 appraisers with the Baldwins, had you?
12
A
Yes, I take that back. I did ask David to do
13 a—make an effort to do an appraisal and he said it didn't
14 matter what the appraisal was, he'd sell it for what he
15 wanted.
16
Q
When did that happen?
17
A
It was when I was asking David for a price on it.
18 If we couldn't come to a price, to at least have an
19 appraisal done on the property.
20
Q
And would that have been in the latter part of
21 December, '92, before he sent you the $320,000 offer?
22
A
Yes.
23
Q
You had never discussed with either Mr. or
Mrs .
2 4 Baldwin the idea that you would select one independent
2 5 appraiser, they would select one, and then those two
would
PAGE
419
1 select a third, had you?
2
A
Not in those exact words, no.
3
Q
Had you discussed it in any approximate words?
4
A
I asked David to get an appraisal on the
property.
5
Q
And they did not agree to do so, did they?
6
A
They did not do anything.
7
Q
They didn't agree to do so, did they?
8
A
They didn't disagree or agree.
9
MR. WILLARDSON: Your Honor, may I have an
10 instruction to the witness concerning leading questions on
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11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

cross examination.
THE COURT: No, you the may not. Ask your next
question, counsel. It seems to me like she's answered to
the best of her ability.
MR. WILLARDSON: May I have a side-bar, please.
THE COURT: Sure. Side-bar.
BENCH CONFERENCE OUTSIDE THE JURY
THE COURT: Say it quiet, counsel.
MR. WILLARDSON: Sorry.
I'm entitled to lead this witness on cross
examination.
THE COURT: Youfre entitled to what?
MR. WILLARDSON: Lead this witness.
THE COURT: Nobody stopped you from leading the
witness.
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1
MR. WILLARDSON: Okay. Therefore I'm entitled to
2 have responsive answer to my leading question. It's
3 possible for her to answer. Therefore, I should be entitled
4 to have the witness instructed that if I ask a question that
5 is capable of being answered, either yes or no, that she
6 should answer yes, or no. And if not being answered yes or
7 no, that she should so state.
8
THE COURT: You didn't ask her to say yes or no,
9 No. 1. No. 2, she answered your question. So she did. As
10 far as I'm concerned, she did. And I'm not going to
11 instruct her to do something I think she's already done, so
12 that's the response.
13
MR. WILLARDSON: Okay.
14
CROSS EXAMINATION CONTINUED
15
BY MR. WILLARDSON:
16
Q
I'm going to ask you a yes or no question and if
17 you can, I'd like you to give me a yes or no answer.
18
Prior to filing this lawsuit, did you discuss with
19 either Mr. or Mrs. Baldwin that you—oh. I can go a little
20 later than that. Prior to filing in lawsuit, did the
21 Baldwins agree to select appraisers by you selecting one,
22 they selecting one, and those two appraisers selecting a
23 third one?
24
MR. HOWARD: Object. I don't think that question
25 needs to be answered yes, or no.
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1
MR. WILLARDSON: It's a simple statement. Did
2 they, or did they not? It can only be answered yes, or no.
3
THE COURT: Well, the objection is overruled. She
4 can answer it, if she can. Can you answer it yes, or no?
5
THE WITNESS: Not really.
6
Q
BY MR. WILLARDSON: Why can't you answer it yes,
7 or no?
8
A
Because of the statement that David made about
9 appraisals being done.
10
Q
And is that the statement that you previously
11 recounted to us?
12
A
Yes.
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13
Q
And did that statement include anything about
14 three appraisers?
15
A
No. It just asked him to have the appraisal done
16 on the property.
17
Q
And did Mr. Baldwin's statement include
anything
18 about how the three appraisers would be selected?
19
A
None, other than what's stated in the lease.
20
Q
I'm asking about Mr. Baldwin's statement that
you
21 recounted a moment ago, not about the lease?
22
A
No.
He did not.
23
Q
And am I correct in assuming that Mrs. Baldwin
2 4 didn't either?
25
A
That is correct.
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1
Q
Prior to filing this lawsuit, neither of the
2 Baldwins had agreed to accept the full purchase price
in
3 cash, had they?
4
A
They never agreed to anything or disagreed to
5 anything.
6
Q
Pardon me?
7
A
They never agreed or disagreed to anything.
You
8 could never get an answer from David.
9
Q
Do you know what ALTA standards are?
10
A
No.
I do not.
11
Q
Do you know what environmental hazards exists
on
12 the property that has the cafe on it?
13
A
Yes.
14
Q
What are they?
15
A
The underground tanks.
16
Q
And do you know how much it will cost to have
17 those underground tanks removed?
18
A
I do not.
19
Q
And neither of the Baldwins ever agreed to
remove
2 0 those underground tanks, prior to the filing of this
lawsuit
21 either, did they?
22
A
No.
23
Q
Do you remember being—do you remember being asked
24 by your, urn, counsel on direct about what you want out of
25 this lawsuit?
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1
A
No. Oh, yes. The property. Yes, I do. I'm
2 sorry.
3
Q
Do you want both the property and damages?
4
A
Yes.
5
Q
Prior to you filing this lawsuit, the Baldwins had
6 not agreed to give you a option to purchase the property,
7 had they.
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8
MR. HOWARD: Objection.
9
THE COURT: Sustained. The objection is
10 sustained. That's what the whole lawsuit is about.
11
MR. HOWARD: Yes.
12
THE COURT: It's sustained.
13
Q
BY MR. WILLARDSON:
Prior to submitting your
14 tender, you'd never discussed the purchase price of
$40,000
15 to the Baldwins; isn't that correct?
16
A
I asked David what he wanted for it.
17
Q
And he told you $320,000; isn't that correct?
18
A
But that was for everything.
I just wanted
the

19 cafe property.
it-

And he would never give me a price on

20
Q
21 just sell
22
A
23
Q
24
A
25
Q
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1
2
3

And Mr. Baldwin never told you he was willing to
you the cafe, did he?
Yes.
When did he?
In '92.
And when, in f92?
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A
When Mark Austin and I was at his house, he said
if I was to exercise my option, that he would let Mark buy
the house.
Q
And did you discuss a price at that time?
A
No.
Q
Did he discuss any terms at that time?
A
No.
Q
And isn't it the case that the only price given
for the two properties that were being discussed was
$320,000?
A
But I did not want those.
Q
Isn't it t r u e —
MR. HOWARD: Wait a minute. She didn't finish.
She hadn't finished.
MR. WILLARDSON: Oh, I'm sorry. I thought you
were.
THE WITNESS: I did not want any other property
but the cafe property, and David and Gloria both knew that
all along from the very very beginning from the first lease.
Q
At any time is it true that the only price that
you ever received was for both properties?
A
Yes. That is the only price.
Q
And that was the only—only occasion when the
Baldwins discussed with you the sale of the property that
included the cafe.
PAGE 425
MR. HOWARD: Objection, repetitious.
THE COURT: Well, the objection is sustained. I
think it is repetitious.
PAGE

39

426

1
2
3
4
5
6

Q
As far as you know, there are none; is that
correct?
A
I don't know anything on it. He tried to buy the
house and David would not sell it or give it to him. And he
give him a price on it, so he went to Howard and Ida Church
and bought the 28 acres instead.

16
Q
BY MR. WILLARDSON:
Did you ever talk to the
17 Baldwins about whether the water would stay with the
house
18 or go with the cafe?
19
A
No.
I just assumed that it would go with the
2 0 cafe.
It was hooked up to the cafe.
The meter was
there.
21
Q
When what?
22
A
The meter was there. And I assumed that it would
23 go with the cafe when it was purchased.
24
Q
And you're aware, aren't you, that that water
25 right cannot be split, aren't you?
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1
A
No.
2
Q
You're not aware of that? I'd like to you turn to
3 page 43 of your deposition.
4
Okay. I'll start at the top. Witness looks at
5 exhibit that's line No. 1.
6
ANSWER: "Yes."
7
QUESTION: "Was a copy of that furnished to you
8 with his letter of June 10th?" And just for the record,
9 that's EXHIBIT 6 to the deposition, which is the letter from
10 the Boulder Water Company; do you agree with that?
11
A
Yes.
12
Q
Okay. So you were looking at this Boulder Water
13 Company letter; right?
14
A
Yes.
15
Q
"And was a copy of that furnished to you with a
16 letter of June 10?"
17
ANSWER: "Yes, it was."
18
QUESTION: "It was your understanding that he had
19 just one membership authorizing one water connection."
20
ANSWER: "Yes."
21
QUESTION: "Was that to go with the cafe, or stay
22 with the home?"
23
ANSWER: "It was to go with the cafe. It was a
24 commercial hookup that was hooked up to the cafe first. And
25 David hooked up the house when he bought the house. So then
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1 it was hooked up to the cafe first and my understanding was
2 that it should go with the property that it was hooked to."
3
QUESTION: "I'm going to ask you on what you base
4 your understanding."
5
ANSWER: "Mr. Howard."
6
QUESTION: "Who is Mr. Howard?"
7
ANSWER: "Jackson Howard, my attorney."
8
QUESTION:
"But you don't claim that you and the
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9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Baldwins ever visited about that."
ANSWER:
"Yes, we talked about water."
QUESTION:
"I want to you tell me about when."
ANSWER:
"After I received the letter from David,
he said that he could not separate the water, and after
that, it did not matter about the water to me.
I just
wanted to purchased the property."
Was that your testimony in the deposition?
A
Yes.

18

Q

Is

19

A

Yes.

that

deposition

(Emphasis

testimony

true?

added.)

Plaintiff admitted that the terms of her tender, such as ALTA
title insurance, price, water rights, method of payment, abatement
of environmental hazards were never discussed in making the
agreement, nor at any time prior to the "tender."

Far from being

a suit to enforce an existing agreement, this suit was an attempt
to get the Court to abuse its power by creating a new agreement
that never existed. Unfortunately the Court below was willing to
so abuse its power.

G.

THE MOST BASIC AND ESSENTIAL TERMS OF THE PROPOSED

PURCHASE WERE NEVER AGREED UPON.
In asking the Court to rewrite the agreement Plaintiff
recognizes that the parties have not even identified the property
which would be the subject of the sale. There was no indication as
to where the line would be drawn between the cafe and the home, no
agreement for a survey, no agreement as to who should pay for a
survey, and no inclusion or description of personality or
appurtenances, and no agreement as to who should receive the
single water right. Plaintiff's only understanding as to who
should receive the water right was based on her conversation with
her attorney, Jackson Howard, rather than any conversation with
the Baldwins. In fact, she had never even discussed it with the
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Baldwins. She further acknowledged that there is a flat
disagreement between her and Baldwins on this issue. 3 6
Reduced to bare-bones, the sole and only identifiable
agreement was that the purchase price would be fixed by three
independent appraisers selected by mutual agreement at a future
time (Paragraph 3A of the Agreement) . That language, on its face,
is an "agreement to agree" and therefore unenforceable as the
cases heretofore cited make clear. Sensing the inadequacy,
Plaintiff requests the Court to impose an approach whereby each
party selects an appraiser and then the two appraisers select a
third. Such would not require a future agreement. Perhaps the
parties "ought" to have so agreed. The fact is, they did not, and
reformation is therefore unavailable.55
Subparagraph 3B is even more telling, since it simply states
that "the remaining terms of such purchase shall be established at
that time [in the future] by mutual agreement

" This leaves

open every term. Even if the Court could somehow force the parties
to agree upon appraisers, the property to be appraised has not
been clearly delineated. The Agreement leaves open the vital
issues of warranties, (compare the Tenth Circuit decision in D. H.
Overmyer

& Co.,

supra)

boundaries, what property is included,

title insurance, etc.
With respect to warranties, Plaintiff correctly perceives the
importance of a warranty regarding environmental considerations
and wants the Court to impose this upon Defendants. Mr. Baldwin

Grahn v.

Gregory,

supra
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testified that defendants had received a billing in the amount of
$5,54 6.7256 from the Utah Department of Environmental Quality
growing out of the underground storage tanks at the converted gas
station (the cafe). Defendant David Baldwin testified that removal
of those tanks would cost at least $15,000 to $20,000 even without
determining if there was contamination.57

Plaintiff's appraiser

testified, at page 286 of the transcript that the cost of removal
of such tanks sometimes "far exceeds the value" of the property.
Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendants never agreed to remove the
tanks and there were no negotiations regarding environmental
hazards and meeting Federal and Utah State Environmental
requirements. The continuing liability for, soil contamination (now
imposed by statute), renders a warranty on this item an extremely
important issue in contractual negotiations.
Negotiations between the parties regarding a potential
purchase were minimal and concurrence almost non existent.
Plaintiff acknowledged that the parties never reached any
agreement beyond the bare language of Paragraph 3 of the
Agreement.
The Court cannot specifically enforce an agreement which does
not contain the essential terms, and it cannot supply those terms
under the guise of reformation when no agreement was reached. The
court below, however, did not consider itself so constrained and
the judgment appealed from does just that.

56

Trial exhibit 12, Tr. pp. 598-599.

57

Tr. pp. 610-611.
A3

H.

THERE IS NO AGREEMENT ON THE SINGLE NONDIVISIBLE WATER

MEMBERSHIP AND THE COURT CANNOT SUPPLY THE SAME.
The essential nature of the entitlement to the single,
nondivisible Boulder Farmstead Water membership is not open to
question.58 Without it neither the cafe nor the Defendants'
personal residence can be utilized. There is nothing in the
parties Agreement, nor in the historical facts which this Court
could rely upon in choosing the residence over the cafe or vice
versa.
In terms of historical priority, the residence enjoyed
exclusive utilization of the single water membership prior to
construction of the cafe. While utilization at the old motel
predated that, such was discontinued some 20 years ago and could
hardly be relied upon to boot-strap the cafe ahead of the
Defendants! residence.
I.

IMPROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
As can be seen from the discussion above, it is undisputed

that the material terms of the contract Plaintiff was seeking to
enforce were neither discussed nor agreed to in 1992 when the
agreement was written.

Since it is undisputed that the material

terms of the contract were not agreed to, Defendants should have
been granted summary judgment.

58

Trial exhibit 4 is a letter from the Boulder Farmstead Water
District stating that the share could not be divided. That
assertion was testified to at trial by Mr. Nelson and not
rebutted.
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It is undisputed that the contract signed in 1992 does not
establish a price for sale of the property, but only a method for
the parties to establish a price, and since that procedure was
never followed, Defendants should have been able to obtain summary
judgment.
Since it is undisputed that the water right is essential to
the use of both the property at issue and Defendants1 residence is
indivisible and that therefore a sale is a legal impossibility,
Defendants should have been entitled to summary judgment.
Since it is undisputed that the terms of the "tender" set by
Plaintiffs and Defendants both vary and add to the terms of the
agreement under which the tender was purportedly made, that tender
was ineffective as a tender and constituted merely an offer.
offer was rejected.

That

Therefore, Defendants should have been able

to obtain summary judgment.
In fact, Defendants did obtain summary judgment.

Defendants

moved for summary judgment, had argument on summary judgment, and
were granted summary judgment.

All of those events occurred when

the case was assigned to Judge Mower.

Having received the verbal

ruling granting summary judgment to Defendants, Plaintiff sought
to and succeeded in having Judge Mower recused.
retired judge, was assigned to the case.

Judge Tibbs, a

Judge Tibbs reversed

Judge Mower's ruling and granted summary judgments to Plaintiff
who had not moved for summary judgment.
Since there was no motion and memorandum supporting summary
judgment for Plaintiff, the only basis that Judge Tibbs could have
made such a ruling upon was that on the face of the Complaint and
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Answer Plaintiff had established its cause of action.

Because the

Complaint on which Judge Tibbs was ruling did not even include
both of the parties who were the owners of the property as
Defendant, and because the Complaint expressly asks for terms
which are different from and in addition to the terms of the
agreement upon which it was based, summary judgment was clearly
inappropriate.
Since the Court's trial of the case was limited by its ruling
on summary judgment, the result below must be reversed.

J.

THE TRIAL BELOW WAS PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE
The Plaintiff sought, and obtained from the lower the court,

both a legal and inequitable remedy.

They received the equitable

remedy of specific performance, and the legal remedy of $8,000.00
in damages.

It is hornbook law that equitable remedies exist to

do justice when a legal remedy is inadequate. 27A Am. Jur. 2d
Equity

§§ 1, 29-30 (1996) states:
[§1] "Equity" has been said to be the name of the principle
or set of principles under which substantial justice may be
attained in particular cases where the prescribed or
customary forms of ordinary law seem to be inadequate.
[§29]
Historically, the test of equity's jurisdiction in
any given case was that the suitor could not get relief or
could not get adequate relief in a court of common law. It
is accordingly said that the test of equity jurisdiction is
the absence of a legal remedy. Subject to certain
qualifications, if a judicially cognizable right exists, and
no other adequate remedy is available, equity has
jurisdiction and will grant appropriate relief, unless
prevented by some supervening principle, and subject, of
course, to the recognition of all equitable defenses.
The availability of an adequate legal remedy is a
threshold determination. The plaintiff must affirmatively
show a lack of an adequate remedy at law on the face of the
pleading and from the evidence.
The mere existence of a possible remedy at law is not
sufficient to warrant the denial of equitable relief.
[§30]
It is a basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that
courts of equity should not act when the moving party has an
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adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury
if denied equitable relief. Equity jurisdiction is therefore
generally excluded if there is an adequate remedy at law.
Some decisions to this effect have been under statutes or
rules of practice which prescribe this limitation on the
jurisdiction of equity. Furthermore, some decisions refer to
a constitutional provision which guarantees the right of
trial by jury, and having held that such provision makes it
necessary that the plaintiff proceed at law. Once a remedy
at law has been resorted to, it must be exercised in its
entirety before a remedy in equity may be sought.
(Citations omitted.)
In this instance there is neither showing by plaintiff nor
finding by the court below that the legal remedy of damages was
inadequate.

As is discussed above, the equitable remedy itself

should have been unavailable, but the Court awarded both.
Defendants1 requested jury instructions on ambiguity, lack of
meeting of the minds, intentions of the parties, etc.
instructions were refused.

All those

While that refusal was consistent with

Judge Tibbsf gratuitous grant of summary judgment to Plaintiff,
they were inconsistent with the law.
enforce a contract.

Plaintiff was seeking to

Defendants raised objections as to proper

parties, meeting of the minds, ambiguity, enforceability, etc. in
their Amended Answer.

All of those theories were foreclosed by

the Court both by its rulings on evidence, by its rulings of
refusing jury instructions and by its refusal to give appropriate
special verdict interrogatories.
VIII.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The proceedings below were fatally flawed from the time that

Judge Tibbs took over the case.

The culmination of those errors

was a judgment which creates a contract for sale of real property
merely from Plaintiff's wish list.

47

The lower court apparently

determined the result prior to the trial and would let neither
logic nor law stand in the way of its desired outcome.

At one

point in the trial the judge held that the contract was
unambiguous.

Later the judge denied making such a holding.

The

judgment fixes a price based on the testimony of a single
appraiser.

That is in violation of the express terms of the

agreement that the Court claimed it was enforcing. The Court
required abatement of and warranty against environmental hazards.
Such issues were never even discussed between the parties, and the
uncontroverted testimony shows that such costs equal or exceed the
purchase price of the property.

The matter of water rights for

the property were never discussed between the parties.
water rights are indivisible.

Those

Nevertheless, the Court fashioned a

contract which requires water to be supplied to the property in
violation of the water right that does exist.

The contract

created by the Court is binding upon both Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin,
but the 1992 agreement which the Court uses as an excuse for
creating the new contract is signed by only one of the owners of
the property.

Early in the proceedings the Court recognized that

both parties were essential to alienation of the property by
allowing Plaintiff to amend her Complaint to include Mrs. Baldwin.
The Court found no impediment in the absence of Mrs. Baldwin to
the disposition of the property.

Such a disposition violates the

statute of frauds.
Since it is contrary to law for a Court to order specific
performance of an ambiguous contract, it is a fortiori

illegal for

the Court to order specific performance of a contract which omits
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material terms and which has been created after the fact by the
Court.

The Court's decision must therefore be reversed.

This case was originally set before Judge Mower.

Judge Mower

examined both sides and correctly concluded that Plaintiff had no
cause.

A summary judgment order was drafted.

In what turned out

to a successful attempt to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat,
Plaintiff moved to have Judge Mower recused.

Judge Mower left the

case, Judge Tibbs was assigned, and the case was won by Plaintiff
at that point.

Judge Tibbs granted summary judgment in favor of

Plaintiff, in spite of the fact that Plaintiff had not even
requested summary judgment.
The trial which followed was a sham.

Judge Tibbs foreclosed

Defendants1 proof at trial, eventually refusing even to accept
proffers.

Judge Tibbs refused every jury instruction requested by

Defendants.

Judge Tibbs refused to give special verdict

interrogatories requested by Defendants.

The effect of all of

those actions by the lower court was to prevent Defendants from
obtaining a fair consideration of their position.
The result below is contrary to both law and equity.
be reversed.
D A T E D ; ^ : ^ r i d a y , October 11, 1996.
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